Bussey v. Legislative Auditing Committee, 298 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 304 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1974) by Weinbaum, Stephen J.
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 3 | Issue 3 Article 10
Summer 1975
Bussey v. Legislative Auditing Committee, 298 So.
2d 219 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 304 So.
2d 451 (Fla. 1974)
Stephen J. Weinbaum
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Stephen J. Weinbaum, Bussey v. Legislative Auditing Committee, 298 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 304 So. 2d 451 (Fla.
1974), 3 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 476 (2014) .
http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol3/iss3/10
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
certainly a factor to be considered. 42 While some Florida cases have
prorated liability, it seems clear that those results were reached be-
cause of an additional proration clause in one of the policies 43 or be-
cause both insured parties were considered owners.4 4
It is not clear that the Mississippi approach is the result desired
by the Stauffer court. Clearly that solution would not result in "full
coverage" under both policies. This language would reasonably in-
dicate some type of proration, and would be in accord with the ma-
jority view in the United States.45 In addition, the attorneys for
petitioner's insurer believe that proration is the correct interpreta-
tion of the court's opinion. 6
The ambiguity of the decision results in confusion and uncertainty
in this area of the law. To a certain extent, any precedent in this
field is of limited value because of the importance of the precise
language of the policies and the facts involved in each case. But the
failure of the Stauffer court to state its position clearly cannot be ex-
cused by the lack of precedent or confusing facts. A clear guide to the
road Florida will follow in resolving "other insurance" problems must
await future decisions.
MARY F. CLARK
ProceSS-PERSONAL SERVICE OF LEGISLATIVE WITNESS SUBPOENA DOES
NOT CONFER IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION ON CIRCUIT COURT IN PRO-
CEEDINGS To ENFORCE THAT SUBPOENA.-Bussey v. Legislative Audit-
ing Committee, 298 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied,
304 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1974).
On August 27, 1973, in a sixth floor hallway of a Tampa office
building, Robert N. Bussey was offered a witness subpoena by an
agent of the Florida Legislative Auditing Committee. Bussey was
accompanied by his attorney, who, at his request, accepted the sub-
42. Id. at 777.
43. Motor Vehicle Cas. Co. v. Atlantic Nat'l Ins. Co., 374 F.2d 601 (5th Cir. 1967);
Factory Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of America v. Continental Cas. Co., 267 F.2d 818 (5th Cir.
1959); Continental Cas. Co. v. St. Paul Mercury Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 163 F. Supp.
325 (S.D. Fla. 1958).
44. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 277 So. 2d 775 (Fla.
1973).
45. See notes 22, 23 and accompanying text supra.
46. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 8, World Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Stauffer, No.
46,908 (Fla. filed Feb. 13, 1975): "The result of [the Second District's] ruling, if given
effect, would mean that each insurance company would respond to the Plaintiff's
damages pro tanto."
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poena in his stead and signed it with the notation, "accepted under
protest." The subpoena required Bussey to appear before the commit-
tee on September 18, 1973, and to bring with him specified docu-
ments. The legislature was not then in session."
Bussey resided outside the United States. 2 He was in Tampa as a
defendant in an unrelated civil action in federal district court. His
attorney notified the committee by mail that Bussey would not appear
as directed. The committee, pursuant to subsection 11.143(4)(b),
Florida Statutes,3 responded by initiating criminal contempt proceed-
ings in circuit court. Copies of the complaint and order to show cause
were mailed to Bussey's attorney in Tampa, who promptly filed a
motion to dismiss. The attorney argued that service of process by mail
on himself was insufficient to vest in the court jurisdiction over the
defendant.* The circuit court denied the motion. It reasoned that the
contempt cause was a continuation of proceedings initiated by the
personally served legislative subpoena, and that the statute contemplat-
ed no new service of process.5 Bussey took an interlocutory appeal. In
Bussey v. Legislative Auditing Committee,6 the First District Court
of Appeal held that the circuit court had not acquired personal juris-
diction over the defendant and reversed. The Florida Supreme Court
denied certiorari.7
1. For factual and procedural background of the case, see file on Legislative
Auditing Committee v. Bussey (Office, Legislative Auditing Committee, Capitol Building,
Tallahassee, Florida) [hereinafter cited as Committee File].
2. Bussey's legal residence for jurisdictional purposes was a disputed issue. He con-
tended that his legal residence was in Argentina. The committee listed addresses for
him in Costa Rica, Argentina, Mexico and St. Petersburg, Florida; it maintained that
the Florida address was his legal residence. The circuit court did not reach the question.
See Committee File.
3. FLA. STAT. § 11.143(4)(b) (1973) provides:
Should any witness fail to respond to the lawful subpoena of any such committee
at a time when the legislature is not in session or, having responded, fail to
answer all lawful inquiries or to turn over evidence that has been subpoenaed,
such committee may file a complaint before any circuit court of the state setting
up such failure on the part of the witness. On the filing of such complaint,
the court shall take jurisdiction of the witness and the subject matter of said
complaint and shall direct the witness to respond to all lawful questions and to
produce all documentary evidence in his possession which is lawfully demanded.
The failure of any witness to comply with such order of the court shall constitute
a direct and criminal contempt of court, and the court shall punish said witness
accordingly.
4. Motion to Dismiss and Quash, Legislative Auditing Comm. v. Bussey, No. 73-
1455 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Leon County, Oct. 9, 1973).
5. Order, Legislative Auditing Comm. v. Bussey, No. 73-1455 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Leon
County, Dec. 11, 1973).
6. 298 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
7. 304 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1974).
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Bussey is the first case involving the application of sub-
section 11.143(4)(b). The Florida Constitution gives the legislature
itself, while in session, the power to adjudge contempt and to punish
noncompliance with lawful legislative subpoenas.8 This power is not
given to interim committees; they must resort to "judicial proceed-
ings as prescribed by law." 9 No statutory provision for such proceed-
ings existed until 1969, when the legislature enacted subsection
11.143(4)(b). That statute directs the circuit court to take personal and
subject matter jurisdiction upon the mere filing with the court of the
complaint in an action to enforce a lawful legislative subpoena. 10
When contempt proceedings are initiated to enforce judicial orders,
Florida courts have recognized that delivery of contempt papers to a
party's attorney may satisfy due process notice requirements. Three
conditions must be met in those cases: the cause from which the con-
tempt arises must be pending or not yet concluded; the defendant
must receive actual notice; and the attorney must not have dis-
claimed representation of the defendant." In such actions, the court
has obtained jurisdiction in the original cause by means of valid ju-
dicial process. Bussey raised the question of whether non-judicial ser-
vice of process, i.e. a legislative subpoena, satisfies personal jurisdiction
requirements in subsequent judicial proceedings.
The Bussey court might have extended prior case law to embrace
the situation where a personally served legislative subpoena is followed
by mailing of the contempt complaint to the attorney of record. Alter-
natively, it could have read the statute as a straightforward grant of
personal jurisdiction, and proceeded to consider directly any constitu-
tional problems raised by the statute.
The Bussey court did neither. It simply stated that the objective
of process is to give the party notice of the proceedings; that the cir-
8. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 5 provides:
Each house, when in session, may compel attendance of witnesses and produc-
tion of documents and other evidence upon any matter under investigation
before it or any of its committees, and may punish by fine not exceeding one
thousand dollars or imprisonment not exceeding ninety days, or both, any person
not a member who has been guilty of disorderly or contemptuous conduct in its
presence or has refused to obey its lawful summons or to answer lawful questions.
Such powers, except the power to punish, may be conferred by law upon committees
when the legislature is not in session. Punishment of contempt of an interim
legislative committee shall be by judicial proceedings as prescribed by law.
9. Id. FLA. STAT. § 11.141 (1973) authorizes the creation of interim committees.
FLA. STAT. § 11.143 (1973) details their investigatory powers.
10. See note 3 supra.
11. Ginsberg v. Ginsberg, 122 So. 2d 30, 32 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1960). See Reizen
v. Florida Nat'l Bank, 237 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1970). Both cases were
cited by the Bussey court. See note 17 infra.
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cuit court action was distinct from the legislative proceedings; and
that therefore the circuit court had no personal jurisdiction "until
proper notice is given to that defendant of the action or proceedings
against him. '' 12 Though the court could have reasoned that the "con-
tinuous proceedings" rule was inapplicable to the instant case because
a legislative subpoena is insufficient to notify the recipient that a court
is preparing to pass on his rights, it did not expressly apply such a
rationale.
Moreover, the court's treatment of the statute was conclusory.
Though the legislative intent can only be gleaned from the law itself,13
the statute seems unambiguous. It provides: "On the filing of such
complaint, the court shall take jurisdiction of the witness and the
subject matter of said complaint .... .4 Nonetheless, the court refused
to accept the plain statutory language. The opinion stated that to in-
terpret the statute as conferring personal jurisdiction would violate
due process provisions of the state and federal constitutions, since ade-
quate notice would not be provided.15 The statutory language was
therefore read to grant only subject matter jurisdiction. 16
The conclusion reached as to the adequacy of notice was con-
spicuously devoid of supporting documentation. 7 Apparently the pre-
12. 298 So. 2d at 221.
13. There is nothing enlightening in this regard in either the 1969 Session Laws
or the 1969 House Journal. There were no amendments to the bill, Fla. H.R. 1490 (1969).
Committee records are nonexistent.
14. FLA. STAT. § 11.143(4)(b) (1973); see note 3 supra. Though the Bussey court
made no mention of such an argument, it might be contended that the words "on
the filing of such complaint" refer to the normal method of initiating judicial proceed-
ings. This, of course, ordinarily embraces personal service of the complaint. That argu-
ment is unpersuasive, however, in view of the legislature's broad contempt powers
while in session. See note 8 supra. The more reasonable construction of § 11.143(4)(b)
is that the complaint need merely be filed with the court; in granting interim committees
the power to enforce their subpoenas, the legislature probably intended to draw upon
as much of its in-session power as possible.
15. 298 So. 2d at 221.
16. Id.
17. The only cases cited were Reizen v. Florida Nat'l Bank, 237 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1970), and Ginsberg v. Ginsberg, 122 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1960). Both cases were cited in support of the rule allowing service on a party's at-
torney "where the cause is pending or not yet concluded." 298 So. 2d at 221. See note 11
and accompanying text supra. The court held this rule inapplicable.
The only other citations were to Florida Jurisprudence and American Jurisprudence
2d. The court cited 25 FLA. JUR. Process §§ 3-4 (1959) for the proposition: "Where
the defendant does not enter a voluntary general appearance or otherwise waive service
of process, the issuance and service of process is indispensable to the jurisdiction of the
Court, even though the Court may have jurisdiction of the subject matter." 298 So. 2d
at 221. This statement supports neither party. No one contended that there was no
service of process. The issue was rather the sufficiency of the method of service used,
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cise issues raised in Bussey have not been litigated elsewhere. There
is one case, however, that deals with closely related issues. In State v.
Uphaus,1' the defendant failed to comply fully with a personally served
witness subpoena from the Attorney General of New Hampshire. The
latter petitioned the superior court to have the defendant appear
there and fully comply with the attorney general's subpoena, or to
hold the defendant in contempt of that court for failure to comply. A
New Hampshire statute 9 appeared to give the trial court both subject
matter and personal jurisdiction. On appeal, the New Hampshire Su-
preme Court reversed the trial court's finding of contempt and held
that the lower court had not acquired jurisdiction over the defendant.
The court construed the law to grant only subject matter jurisdiction
and, since the attorney general had apparently only mailed a copy of
the petition to the defendant's Connecticut home,2 0 found that the
trial court lacked jurisdiction over the person. The supreme court
so held in view of the "well established principle of law that there
must be personal service in this jurisdiction on a nonresident de-
fendant to give the Court jurisdiction over his person.' ' 2 1
Despite the support provided by Uphaus, the Bussey decision is
unfortunate in two respects. First, the Bussey court's determination
that notice was insufficient begs the question involved: was the de-
fendant in this case denied either effective notice or opportunity to be
heard? The argument avails that a legislative subpoena is not notice
of judicial proceedings, but it is not compelling in light of the facts
that of a personally served legislative subpoena followed by a mailing of the complaint
to the attorney of record.
The opinion also cited 62 Am. JUR. 2d Process § 2 (1972): "To say that process
confers jurisdiction means that it empowers the court to exercise authority derived
from law." 298 So. 2d at 221. And finally, quoting 62 AM. JuR. 2d Process § 3 (1972), the
Bussey court said, " 'A judgment against one who was not given notice in the manner
required by law of the action or proceeding in which such judgment was rendered
lacks all the attributes of a judicial determination; it is judicial usurpation and op-
pression, and can never be upheld where justice is fairly administered.'" 298 So. 2d at 221.
Again, neither of these statements directly addresses the issues involved.
18. 116 A.2d 887 (N.H. 1955).
19. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 491:20 (1968) provides: "Procedure. Upon such petition
the court or justice shall have authority to proceed in the matter as though the original
proceeding had been in the court, and may make orders and impose penalties accord-
ingly." Compare the above language to the seemingly explicit and mandatory con-
ference of subject matter and personal jurisdiction in FLA. STAT. § 11.143(4)(b) (1973).
See note 3 supra.
20. 116 A.2d at 890. The opinion does not specify how the petition was served, but
notes that the only personal service in the case was of the subpoena. Id. at 889.
21. Id. (emphasis added). Notwithstanding the statutory language, see note 19
supra, the New Hampshire Supreme Court found that the legislative intent was "not
to make the proceedings ancillary to and a mere continuation of the hearing before
the Attorney General." Id.
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of the case. Offered the legislative subpoena, Bussey had his attorney
accept and sign it in his stead. A month later, the same attorney re-
ceived a copy of the complaint and order to show cause by mail, and
immediately proceeded to represent the defendant in the circuit
court. In these circumstances it seems safe to conclude that Bussey
had both actual notice and an opportunity to defend.
Secondly, the Bussey court failed to consider the ramifications of
its decision as respects the legislative investigatory process. It clearly
created a loophole by which an intractable witness may successfully
avoid the command of a personally served legislative subpoena issued
by an interim committee. A potential witness may fail to appear, or
appear and fail to respond to lawful questions. While such action pro-
vides grounds for a judicial criminal contempt citation,2 2 he need
only leave the jurisdiction23 or conceal his whereabouts to avoid such
penalty, for he will then not be amenable to personal service in the
contempt proceeding. After Bussey, an interim committee can only en-
force its subpoena by twice effecting personal service.
The loophole may be closed by amending the existing statute. A
provision might be added authorizing personal service of a legislative
subpoena containing a specific and clearly printed notice to the
witness that the subpoena was filed with a circuit court; that the
recipient is thereby submitting to the personal jurisdiction of that
court in the event of an action to enforce the subpoena should he
not comply; and that process will thereafter be served by mail upon
him, at his last known residence, or upon his attorney of record. The
subpoena would be filed with a circuit court and personally served by
a sheriff or other designated agent, like any civil complaint. By
utilizing judicial service of process in the first instance, an interim
committee should be able to meet the Bussey court's objections.
In addition, a provision might be added to the Florida "long
arm" statute, section 48.193, making noncompliance with a personal-
ly served, lawful legislative subpoena an act upon which extra-state
service might be predicated. Though legislation embodying these two
approaches has been drafted,24 it has not yet been introduced. If in-
22. If the legislature were in session, it would be unnecessary to seek a judicial
contempt citation. While in session, the legislature itself can render a contempt citation.
See note 8 supra.
23. Bussey did precisely that in this case. See Committee File.
24. The operative language of the draft amendment to § 11.143 provides:
11.143(3)(e)(1): Any committee, whether or not the legislature is then in session,
that causes a subpoena to be served by a sheriff or by a duly constituted agent
of a Florida legislative committee as authorized by Section 11.143(3)(d) Florida
Statutes (1973), shall have the power to have any such subpoena served as follows:
1975]
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terim committees are to avoid the necessity of dual personal service
and its concomitant risks, such legislation is necessary. While the vast
majority of legislative subpoenas are honored, the Bussey decision has
weakened the legislature's ability to deal effectively with recalcitrant
witnesses.
STEPHEN J. WEINBAUM
The subpoena shall contain in clear, bold faced type, the following words:
"Notice: This legislative subpoena has been filed with the Circuit Court of
(county and circuit), Florida, on (date), and by the authority of Section 11.143(3)(e),
Florida Statutes, 1975, is therefore both the process of the above named circuit
court and of the herein named legislative committee, SUCH THAT: Personal
service of this subpoena upon (name) shall constitute notice to such person
that he or she shall be subjected to the jurisdiction of the above named circuit
court in any action by the named committee in such circuit court for a contempt
citation, order to show cause, or to otherwise enforce this subpoena. The com-
plaint in any such action therefore need not be personally served, but may be
mailed to the above named person at his or her last known address in the
United States or to his or her attorney of record as authorized by F.S. 48.193 (1)."
11.143(3)(e)(2): Such subpoena as authorized by subsection (1) of this section,
when personally served by a sheriff or by a duly constituted agent of a Florida
legislative committee, as authorized by Section 11.143(3)(d), Florida Statutes, con-
taining the notice as provided by subsection (1) of this section, duly filed in any
circuit court of the State and bearing evidence of such filing, shall obviate the
need for further personal service when a committee proceeds under Section 11.143
(4)(b) Florida Statutes, 1973, to invoke the in personam jurisdiction of the circuit
court. In such circumstances, the complaint specified in Section 11.143(4)(b) may be
served by U.S. Mail, either upon the defendant-witness at his or her last known
address in the United States, or upon his or her attorney of record as authorized
by Florida Statute § 48.193(l). The circuit court thereafter shall take jurisdiction
of the witness and the subject matter of said complaint as provided by Section
11.143(4)(b). This section shall not affect the power of the legislature or any
committee thereof to proceed as elsewhere provided for by law.
It is the intent of this section that a subpoena served in compliance with
Section 11.143(3)(e)(1) and (2) shall be deemed to begin proceedings in the circuit
court such that any further action arising from the issuance of said subpoena
shall be considered a continuation of such proceedings personal notice having been
given the witness and judicial service of process having been utilized in the
first instance.
The draft amendment to Fla. Stat. § 48.193(l) would make a person subject to
the jurisdiction of Florida courts if he " (h) Fails to respond to any lawful legislative
subpoena lawfully served or, respond[s] but fail[s] to answer all lawful inquiries or
turn over all evidence that has been subpoenaed."
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